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Abstract
We develop a dual currency search model where agents can hold currency portfolios to buy goods, and
analyze an agent's choice to spend safe dollars or risky home currency for internal trade.

We focus on

two equilibria: a currency competition equilibrium, in which the 'good' currency (dollars) is spent first and
the 'bad' (risky home) currency is kept for later purchases, and a Gresham's Law equilibrium in which
agents do the reverse. We prove that for the Gresham's Law equilibrium to prevail, trading frictions and
the home currency risk must be small. Otherwise, extensive currency substitution occurs and the currency
competition equilibrium prevails. Interestingly, because transaction velocity is endogenous, we demonstrate
that as the home currency risk rises, currency substitution causes a decline in the transaction velocity of the
bad currency while increasing it for the good currency.

JEL: E4, E5, D7 Keywords: Money, Currency Substitution, Search.

*We thank participants at seminars at the FRB-Cleveland and Purdue's CIBER for research support.

"The full-bodied coins that are the pride of Athens are never used while the mean brass
coins pass hand to hand." - Aristophanes, "The Frogs"

"[In the post-World War I European hyperinflation,] the lack of a stable domestic means
of payments was a serious inconvenience ... and foreign currencies therefore came to be
desired ... as a means of payment ... Thus, in advanced inflation, "Gresham's Law" was
reversed: good money tended to drive out bad ... " - League of Nations (1946, p. 48)
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Introduction

Monetary history is replete with examples in which different objects are accepted as media of
exchange - gold and silver coins, several privately issued bank notes, or two fiat currencies. Of
particular interest to economists is what happens to transaction patterns when one of the monies
is viewed as being 'superior' in some way to the others. As illustrated by Aristophane's quote, a
common belief has been that the inferior currency would circulate more widely than the superior
currency. We know this as Gresham's Law- bad money drives out good money. In this situation,
buyers holding both monies prefer to spend the bad money and hold onto the good one for future
consumption. The implication of this is that bad currency circulates more widely with the limiting
case being that only the bad currency circulates. 1
However, the second quote is based on an observation that is contrary to Gresham's Law. Even
today, a common occurrence in developing countries is for a 'good' foreign currency (dollars) to
circulate more widely than the 'bad' domestic currency2 Here, agents spend the good currency and
hold onto the bad currency for future consumption. Consequently, the good currency circulates
more widely with the limiting case being that only the good currency circulates. Hayek (1976)
argued that this spending pattern was the logical outcome of 'currency competition', in which case
good money drives out bad money.
While Gresham's Law and currency competition are generally accepted by economists as describing rational spending behavior, these two outcomes imply contradictory transaction patterns.
1

With commodity monies, agents could also 'ship out' the good currency or 'melt it down'. Episodes involving such

actions have been described in Rolnick and Weber (1986) and Sargent and Smith (1997). Obviously, fiat currencies
cannot be 'melted down' but they can be imported or exported for use as media of exchange (Peterson, 2001).
2
This phenomenon is commonly known as currency substitution.
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Thus, a fundamental challenge for monetary economists is to determine, within a common framework, conditions under which one currency circulates more widely than another. In short, the
question we ask is as follows: if two currencies are generally accepted in trade, when will agents
spend the bad currency and hold the good currency for future consumption? When will they do
the opposite?
To address these questions, we need to construct a trading environment in which money is
essential as a medium of exchange and agents' transaction patterns are carefully specified. Consequently, we conduct our analysis using a search-theoretic model of money, in the tradition of
Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). We build a one country, two-currency model in which agents are
allowed to hold multiple units of fiat monies, and prices are endogenously formed. The two currencies are fundamentally different in that one is assumed to be 'risky', whereas the other is not. We
call the safe currency 'good', and the risky currency 'bad'. In equilibrium, spending patterns and
the distribution of prices are driven by the relative riskiness of the currencies and not by ad-hoc
transactions costs or institutional restrictions.
We start by analyzing equilibria in which agents prefer to spend the good currency first and
the bad currency later. We refer to this as the 'currency competition' equilibrium since the good
currency is used more frequently as a medium of exchange. Our analysis shows that this equilibrium
will tend to arise when the risk on the domestic currency is sufficiently large and the trading
environment does not function well, i.e. trading frictions are severe.
We then study a 'Gresham's Law' type of equilibrium in which agents choose the opposite
spending pattern. They spend the bad currency first, and hold on to the good currency for future
purchases. While this may appear to be the most obvious strategy for the buyer, our analysis
reveals that, in fact, this equilibrium is harder to support. The reason is that while getting rid
of the bad (risky) currency first makes sense for the buyer, it effectively transfers the risk onto
the seller who will not accept the risk without being compensated. Compensation takes the form
of higher prices in terms of the risky currency, which in turn lowers current consumption for the
buyer. If the currency risk is large enough, the buyer gets so little for the bad currency that he
would prefer to spend the good currency first. We show that this Gresham's Law equilibrium will
only tend to exist if the risk on the bad currency is sufficiently low and the trading environment is
well-functioning, i.e., trading frictions are very low.

2

Despite its level of abstractness, we believe that the model captures key aspects of many developing economies where the dollar circulates alongside the domestic currency. Our analysis suggests
that the level of 'dollarization' can be kept low as long as the domestic currency risk is low and the
domestic trading environment is well functioning. However, should currency risk get out of hand or
the economic trading environment break down, a high degree of dollarization will be the outcome.
Our model generates an equilibrium distribution of real exchange rates. We can show that an
increase in domestic currency risk leads to a depreciation in the real value of the domestic currency
and an increase in the dispersion of observed real exchange rates. Finally, we show numerically
that as the risk on the domestic currency increases, its transaction velocity falls while that of the
foreign currency increases.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of related literature.
Section 3 describes the economic environment. Section 4 contains our definition of an equilibrium.
Section 5 examines the currency competition equilibrium. Section 6 examines the Gresham's Law
equilibria. Section 7 contains numerical analysis. Section 8 contains concluding comments.

2

Related Literature

A substantial amount of research has looked at environments with competing currencies. Giovannini
and Turtleboom (1994) provide a good survey of this line ofresearch and the types of models used.
They group most research on currency substitution into three classes of models: 1) cash-in-advance
models, 2) transaction cost models and 3) ad-hoc models. The main problem with all of these
models is that they do not have a fundamental role for money as a medium of exchange. Hence,
arbitrary restrictions regarding the use of money and/or ad-hoc transaction costs from using a
particular currency must be employed. A more preferred approach would be to construct a model
in which money has an explicit role, in an environment in which trading frictions are not a function
of the currency used. In short, we want a level trading field.
Search theoretic models of money have these properties and have been used to study the use
of multiple currencies as media of exchange. 3 Search models have been used to study currency
3

For example, Aiygari, Wallace and Wright (1996) examine rate of return dominance and coexistence of dual

media of exchange. Matsuyama, Kiyotaki and Matsui (1993), Wright and Trejos (2001), Kocherlakota and Krueger
(1999), Camera and Winkler (2000) look at international versus national currencies. Zhou (1997), Waller and Curtis
(2001), Craig and Waller (2001), Head and Shi (2000), Ravikumar and Wallace (2001) generate currency exchange.

3

substitution and Gresham's Law [Velde, Weber and Wright (1999), Renero (1999) and Burdett et
a!. (2001)] but this work has focused almost exclusively on the use of commodity money in order to
distinguish between 'superior' and 'inferior' currencies, and not fiat currencies. Furthermore agents
are generally allowed to carry only one unit of money when conducting trade, i.e. they cannot hold
currency portfolios, which makes it impossible to study equilibria in which, in a match, an agent
must choose to spend one currency or the other when buying goods. 4 Furthermore, it is not possible
to study how changes in the relative inferiority of the domestic currency alters transaction patterns
and circulation of each currency. We believe that transaction patterns are crucial to understanding
the process of currency competition. Thus, the model in this paper is the first to study currency

competition and Gresham's Law in this fashion.

3

Economic Environment

The environment is based on the standard monetary search model. There is a continuum of infinitely
lived agents uniformly located on the unit interval who specialize in consumption and production
of goods and services.

There is a continuum of good types defined on the unit circle.

Agents

specialize in production and consumption. Specifically, an agent can produce only one type of
good, but consume a subset of good types. When producing the quantity q

> 0, the agent incurs a

linear production cost measured in units of utility given by c(q) = q. When consuming q units of a
desired consumption good the agent obtains utility

u(q), with u'(q) > 0, u"(q) < 0 and u'(O)

Agents meet bilaterally and at random via a Poisson process with arrival rate a

=

oo.

> 0. The

matching process is such that, contingent on meeting, there is probability x of single coincidence of
wants, and xy of double coincidence. We set y = 0, to rule out barter so that agents must resort to
alternative means of conducting trade, such as money. To make money essential, we assume away
the existence of alternative payments systems or financial intermediaries. Agents can trade with
either currency and, most importantly, the trading frictions are the same for both currencies. We
assume the transaction costs are identical for each currency in terms of its use in trade.
Agents are initially randomly endowed with indivisible units of two types of fiat money, which
we will refer to as the foreign (or, the dollar) and home currency as a way of distinguishing the two.
4

While Craig and Waller (2001) allow agents to hold currency portfolios, the analysis is all done numerically and

the transaction patterns are stunningly complex. Thus, to make any analytical progress, the model used in Craig
and Waller must be reduced dramatically.

4

Each is in constant per capita supply, Mt and Mh, where the subscript

f

refers to foreign and h

denotes home. An individual can hold at most N units of money in total. In order to make one of
the currencies 'inferior', we allow the currencies to be fundamentally different with respect to their
purchasing power risk. Specifically, we proceed as in Li (1995) by assuming that agents can have
their holdings of home currency randomly confiscated by the government.
An agent meets with the government with arrival rate a. Upon meeting an agent holding the
home currency, the government randomly confiscates all ofthe agent's home currency holdings with
probability

T E

[0, 1]. Confiscated currency holdings are destroyed immediately. The government

consumes all goods and services but does not produce them. For this reason, conditional on meeting
a seller, the government buys goods from the agent with probability 17 E [0, 1], paying with a new
unit of home currency. 5 While highly stylized, the randomness of confiscation captures the idea
that the home currency is risky and those holding it are prone to sudden losses of purchasing power.
Because of this difference in the risk, we refer to the foreign currency as the 'good' currency and
the home currency as the 'bad' currency.

4

Symmetric Stationary Equilibria

We study stationary rational expectations equilibria, where symmetric Nash strategies are adopted,
and identical agents use identical time-invariant pure strategies. Furthermore we study equilibria
where the beliefs over strategies and traded quantities are identical across individuals, and each
agent correctly evaluates the potential gains from trade in all matches.
Agents must use money to conduct trade. We examine the case in which both currencies are
fully acceptable media of exchange 6 Agents thus can hold a 'portfolio' of currencies. To simplify
the analysis of the transaction patterns, we let N = 2. The reason for this assumption is two-fold.
First, there is only one 'diversified' currency portfolio consisting of one unit of each currency. This
allows us to focus our entire analysis of spending behavior on the actions of these portfolio holders.
Second, no pure currency trades will arise, i.e., currency does not trade for currency. 7 This allows
5

The government has three parameters under its control, T,T],Mh. Two of these are free parameters while the

third must adjust to maintain a balanced budget constraint. We set T and Mh and let 71 be endogenously determined.
6

There is always an equilibrium in which one or both currencies are not accepted.

7

If the two currencies have different values, then one-for-one currency trades will not exist. With an upper bound

of 2, the only remaining trade is a 2 for 1 trade. However, these trades require that the two traders 'swap' their entire
portfolios, which has to make one of them worse off. So these trades do not occur either. Thus, with an upper bound

5

us to focus on goods trades only and ignore nominal exchange rate determination in pure currency
trades. However, there is the possibility for currency to trade for the other currency plus some
goods, as in Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1996). We rule out these trades for two important
reasons. First, allowing them can generate equilibria in which two identical currencies trade at
different values simply due to beliefs. 8 In order to focus on differences in currency values arising
strictly from 'fundamentals', such as currency risk, this potential source of extrinsic valuation
needs to be controlled for. Preventing these trades is one way to do it. Second, we cannot obtain
any analytical results if these trades are allowed and must resort to numerical methods to study
equilibria where these trades occur as is done in Craig and Waller (2001).
Let

mi

denote the fraction of agents in the economy holding a currency portfolio i, where

z E {0, f, h, 2/, 2h, fh} denotes the composition of the portfolio. For example fh means that the
agent has one unit of each currency, 2/ that she has two units of the foreign currency and so on.
As a result

mi

must satisfy the following constraints:
1 = m 0 +mt +mh+m2f +m 2h+mth

(1)

Mt = mf +2m2!+ mfh
Mh = mh + 2m2h + mfh

where Mt

+ Mh <

2 since N = 2. In a stationary equilibrium

mi

=

0 for all i 9 Furthermore, to

keep the per capita stock of home currency constant the outflows must be offset by the inflows:

(2)
The terms of trade are endogenously formed. Agents with money can be buyers or sellers in a
bilateral match, depending on their trading partner. Agents with no currency, however, can only
be sellers since all exchange must be quid-pro-quo, barter is not feasible, and there is no credit.
Note, however, that since N = 2, only those agents with portfolios 0, h, and

f

can be sellers

Agents with two-unit portfolios can only be buyers; we denote their proportion in the economy
by f.! = m2f

+ m2h + mfh·

The trading mechanism is assumed to be based on take-it-or-leave-it

of 2 units, pure currency trades will not occur.
8

For example, suppose two currencies are identical except for their colors. If agents believe blue currency is more

valuable than red currency, then an equilibrium consistent with this belief can be supported for some parameter
values (see Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright (1996) or Cavalcanti (2000)).
9

The laws of motion depend on the transaction pattern and are described in a later section.

6

bargaining protocol. Specifically, when a buyer meets a seller, he offers the seller a trade of d units
of currency for the quantity q of goods. The seller can accept or reject. Thus, the optimal offer pair
(d, q) is such that the seller is left indifferent between accepting and rejecting it. 10 Consequently,
the seller gets zero net surplus in all trades, and always accepts the currency. When the government
buys goods it also makes a take-it-or-leave-it offers.
To define prices one must specify the equilibrium transaction pattern. We focus on the one
studied by Camera and Corbae (1999), in which agents only spend one unit of money per transaction, i.e. d = 1. In this case the price in a transaction is given by 1/q. While there are many
transaction patterns that one can consider in this setting, we choose this particular pattern because
it is the simplest way to analyze the agent's choice of spending one currency or the other.
We want to determine the conditions under which an agent holding a diversified portfolio will
prefer to spend his unit ofthe good (foreign) currency rather than the bad (home) currency, and vice
versa. The choice of which currency to trade is complicated because it is contingent on the seller's
money holdings. For example, sellers holding a dollar are willing to produce a different amount
for a second dollar than will a seller holding a unit of home currency. Restricting attention to a
representative buyer with portfolio fh, let Pi E [0, 1] denote the probability that he chooses to spend
currency

f

when he is matched to a seller with portfolio i E {0, h,

f}. With the complementary

probability, 1- Pi, he spends his unit of home currency. To describe this buyer's spending strategy,
when d = 1, we use the vector p = (po,Pt,Ph)· We denote by p' the equilibrium strategy vector.
Note that although we will limit our analysis to pure strategies, there are eight possible equilibrium
strategy vectors p*.
Let V; denote the value associated with holding portfolio i for a given vector p'. Furthermore,
let

q;

denote the equilibrium quantity produced by a seller with portfolio i in exchange for one

unit of currency j =
10

f, h.

Under the conjecture that d = 1 and buyer-take-all bargaining, V; must

Because of the indivisibility of money, d must be an integer. Therefore, the optimal offer pair (d,q) may not

maximize the surplus in the match. However, Berent sen, Molico and Wright (2001) show that agents may choose
to engage in lotteries over d to improve the expected surplus from trade. Allowing for lotteries would substantially
complicate the analysis.
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satisfy Vo = 0 and

pV;

x

=

I.=

mju(qj)- x(1 -~t)(V;- Vo)- T(V;- Vo)1(i~h}

2.=

mJu(qj)- x(1 -~t)(V2i- V;)- T(V2i- Vo)1(i~h}

jE(O,J,h}

pV2i

=

x

(3)

jE(O,J,h}

pVfh

=

maxPjE{O,l} x

2.=

mj [pju(q{)

jE(O,J,h}

+ (1- PJ) u(qf)] + x

2.=

mjpj(Vh- Vt)

r/a

is the discount factor

jE(O,J,h}

-x(1 -I' )(Vfh- Vt) - T(Vth - Vt)
where the indicator function 1(i~h} = 1 (and zero otherwise), and p =

adjusted by the arrival rate. It measures the severity of the trading frictions in the economy: as p
goes to zero, frictions vanish. The first term on the right-hand side of each of the value functions
in (3), is the expected utility from current consumption matches, i.e. those with sellers who can

produce one's desired good. With probability xmj the agent meets a seller with portfolio j who
can produce his desired consumption good which pays off utility u( q} ), when currency i is used in

the transaction. The second term is the expected value from changing the portfolio from spending
(or acquiring) a unit of currency, which occurs with probability x(1 - I'). For holders of the home
currency, i = h, the third term is the expected loss from having the government confiscate one's

holdings of home currency. This occurs with probability

T.

For agents holding portfolio

f h,

the

first term represents the expected utility from meeting sellers and acquire consumption goods by
spending a unit of currency.

The first component in the brackets is the utility from choosing

to spend the dollar, with probability PJ, in a match with a seller with portfolio j. The second
component is the utility derived from choosing to spend the home currency in that match. The
second and third terms are the expected payoffs from changing portfolio states and the last term
is the expected loss due to confiscation.

It is useful to manipulate the value functions in (3) in order to show that, for any equilibrium p',
the value of multiple-unit portfolios can be expressed as linear combinations ofthe values associated
with single-unit holdings. Specifically for homogenous portfolios of currency i = h, f

V;
V2i

=
=

1~1'
(1

[mou(qb)

+ mtu(qj) + mhu(qi,)]

+ Ai)Vi

(4)

while for a diversified portfolio

(5)
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where

<
such that asp--+ 0, then At, Ath--+ 1 while Ah

1

< 1 forT> 0. It is immediate that, in a monetary

equilibrium, the expected lifetime utility of any portfolio is bounded below by zero. It is also concave
in the size of currency holdings, whereby V2i S 2V; and Vth S Vh

p'. Furthermore, (V2t- Vt)/Vt =At> (V2h- Vh)/Vh

=

+ Vt

for all parameters and any

Ah, i.e. the percentage gain in expected

lifetime utility from acquiring a second dollar is greater than the percentage gain in utility from
acquiring a second unit of the risky home currency.
In equilibrium, the quantities exchanged in the matches are such that the cost of producing
equals the expected utility from acquiring a unit of currency, that is
Foreign

q6 =

Home
h_u
vh

Vt

qo -

q~

=

V2t- vt

qJ =

vth- vt

q{,

=

vth - vh

q~

V2h - vh

=

(6)

Although the buyer with portfolio fh can choose among eight possible pure strategies, we concentrate on the two opposing cases in which the buyer always spends the dollar, p' = (1, 1, 1),
or he always spend the home currency, p' = (0, 0, 0). We study the other pure strategy equilibria
numerically.
We think ofthep* = (1, 1, 1) case as corresponding to 'currency competition'- agents prefer to
spend the good currency rather than the bad currency when a trading opportunity arises. What is
interesting about this strategy is that the buyer gives up the safe currency and chooses to hold onto
the risky currency rather than dumping the risky currency when the opportunity arises. We consider
the p' = (0, 0, 0) equilibrium to be a 'Gresham's Law' equilibrium because the buyer spends the
bad currency when given the opportunity and hoards the good currency. These opposing strategies
are appealing in that they are non-discriminatory, i.e. all sellers are offered the same currency.
To prove existence of an equilibrium, we follow the approach of Camera and Corbae (1999).
Given the conjecture that d = 1 and a strategy vector p* are optimal, we derive necessary conditions
such that the conjectured strategies are individually optimal. Then we solve for the equilibrium
value functions, quantities, and distributions of portfolios, providing conditions sufficient to satisfy
individual optimality, in term of the parameters of the model.

9

4.1

Individual optimality conditions

To determine the conditions under which the conjectured transaction pattern is individually optimal
we must do the following. First, for any given p', d = 1 is optimal if agents choose to spend at least
one unit of currency but no more than one unit. This implies that for those buyers holding two
units of currency matched to a seller with no currency, the trade surplus from spending one unit

is greater than that from spending both units. Since sellers holding one unit of currency cannot
accept two, due to the inventory constraint, the only meetings that matter are those between twounit buyers and sellers holding no currency. With three types of two-unit buyers there are three
optimality conditions that must be satisfied given by:

+ Vt- V2f > u(V2t) + Vo- V2f
u(Vh) + Vh - V2h > u(V2h) + Vo - V2h
max { u(Vf) + Vh, u(Vh) + Vt} - Vfh > u(Vfh) + Vo

(2/ buyer)

u(Vt)

(7)

(2h buyer)

- Vfh

(fh buyer)

Second, it must be the case that the trade surplus buyers receive from spending one unit of
currency is larger than the payoff from walking away. It is straightforward to show that if buyers
holding one unit of currency choose not to walk away, 2-unit buyers will not walk away either. Since
'rich' sellers (those holding currency) produce less than 'poor' sellers (those with no currency), if

buyers with one unit of currency buy from rich sellers, they will also buy from poor sellers. Since
there are two poor buyer states,

f

and h, and two rich seller states,

f

and h, then the condition to

spend at least one unit generates four optimality constraints and are given by:

+ Vo- Vh > 0
Vh) + Vo - Vh > 0
Vt) + Vo - Vt > 0
Vh) + Vo - Vt > 0

f

u(Vfh- Vt)

(h buyer,

u(V2h -

(h buyer, h seller)

u(V2f u(Vfh -

seller)

(8)

(! buyer, f seller)
(! buyer, h seller)

Finally, under the conjecture that d = 1, we must verify that a buyer at portfolio

fh

chooses

to spend either the dollar or the home currency when he meets a seller. Consequently, the trading
surplus from spending one currency must be larger than the trading surplus from spending the
other currency. Since there are three sellers, {0,

f, h},

10

there are three conditions that need to be

satisfied in order for p to be optimal:

+ Vh- Vfh > u(Vh) + Vt- Vfh
""u(V2f- Vt) + Vh- Vfh > u(Vfh- Vt) + Vt- Vfh
"" u(Vth- Vh) + Vh- Vfh > u(V2h - Vh) + Vt - Vfh

Po= 1
Pt

= 1

Ph

= 1

"" u(Vt)

(9)

and Pi = 0 \fi, if the corresponding inequality is reversed.
Despite the large number of inequalities to be satisfied, it turns out that there is one of particular
interest, namely the first one in (9). It describes the fh buyer's decision to offer a dollar to a seller

with no money. Rewrite it as

This expression has a simple and intuitive interpretation. u (Vt) is the utility gain from spending a
dollar and consuming

q6 =

Vt. Vt is also the value of the foregone portfolio state

gain from spending the good currency is S(Vt)

f.

Thus, the net

=u(Vt) - Vt. Similarly, S(Vh) is the net gain from

using the bad currency. Thus the agent has to compare the two strategies and chooses to spend the
dollar ifthe net gain is larger. Note that the two sides ofthe inequality evaluate the same function at
different points. Thus, the functional form of preferences matters in determining whether spending
the dollar is optimal, and the relative value of the two currencies is the critical element. Specifically,
there are two cases to consider depending on whether the net gain is monotonically increasing in

V or if it decreases as V becomes large.
If S(V) is monotonically increasing, then an immediate result for p' = (1, 1, 1) to individually
optimal is that Vt

> Vh.

In short the dollar must be more valued than the home currency. This

makes intuitive sense because the home currency is risky. By making a purchase with the home
currency the buyer transfers the risk to the seller. However, the seller will not accept the risk unless
he is compensated for it. A natural way to compensate the seller is to ask for a smaller quantity
of goods.

Since agents prefer current to future consumption, and since the net gain increases

monotonically in the value of the transaction, the buyer will prefer to make a dollar purchase,
whenever possible. On the other hand, p' = (0, 0, 0) can be an equilibrium only if Vh

> Vt.

This

implies that the home currency, despite its fundamental risk, has greater purchasing power than
the dollar. In short, not only does the seller accept a risky currency but he chooses to compensate
the buyer in the process by producing more today! It is hard to believe that this behavior can be
supported as an equilibrium on a large region of the parameter space.

11

If S(V) is not monotonically increasing, then it is possible that p' = (0, 0, 0) can be supported
when Vh

< Vt. Intuitively this is because even if the dollar buys more goods, there is a high

opportunity cost in spending it. Consequently, S(Vt) could be very small if the net gain exhibits
decreasing returns for high value transactions. In this case, despite the fact that it buys less today,
it is better to spend the bad currency and hold on to the good currency for future purchases.
Doing so raises the net gain since, the lower opportunity cost more than compensates for the drop
in consumption.

To illustrate how the form of preferences affects this surplus and the possible equilibrium transaction patterns, we will consider two forms of utility. The first is given by u(q) = qa +q, 0

<

!J

< 1.

This function exhibits decreasing relative risk aversion and implies that in a match between an fh
buyer and a seller with no money, the net gain, S(V) =

va, is monotonically increasing in V.

Sec-

ond, we consider the CRRA function u(q) = qa, a specification common in many search-theoretic

models of money. This implies that S(V) =

V

'

=

0, 1 and has a unique maximum at V =

va 1

!J 1-a

V is a hump-shaped function that is zero at

< 1.

Definition. A steady-state dual currency monetary equilibrium is a set of value functions satisfying

Vh, Vt > 0 and (3), a distribution of portfolios satisfying {1}-(2) and

mi

=

0, prices given by (6),

and a set of strategies d and p satisfying (7)-(9).

5

The Currency Competition Equilibrium: p'

=

(1, 1, 1)

In this section we determine conditions under which the buyer with portfolio

fh

decides to spend

the dollar in all transactions. Under the conjecture that p' = (1, 1, 1), (5) becomes

(10)
so that, using ( 6)

(11)

Given the conjectured pattern of transactions, the distribution of portfolio holdings must be
feasible, i.e. it must satisfy (1)-(2) and

mi

E (0, 1). In the steady state it must also be stationary,

12

1.e. mi = 0 for all portfolios i. Due to the linear dependency of mi we need to consider only three
flow conditions. We focus on

In the appendix we derive sufficient conditions for existence of a stationary distribution and show
that it is unique.
Using

(4), (10), and (11), we obtain:
vh

Vt

Ah [mou(Vh)

+ mtu(Ah Vh) + mhu(Ah Vh)]

(15)

=~~--~~--~~~~--~~~~

1-1'

_A-'-t-'-1m--'o'-u-'-(V_,t-'-)_+_m_.l.._fu_.o(_A""-tv_,t'-'.)_+_m___:.::_hu__,(~V,_f----'(_1_-_A__::h:.c_)_vh=)I

=

1-1'
(16) is defined only for Vt > (1 - Ah) Vh. Note that Vh

where

(16)

=

0 solves (15) and (16); this

denote a positive fixed point of the map g1ven by

(15) and (16). We discuss

=

Vt

is the non-monetary equilibrium.
Let

(Vj, v;)

existence of positive fixed points in the next lemma (all proofs of lemmas and propositions are in
the appendix).

Lemma 1. Suppose d =

always exists a unique

1 and p'

v;,

=

and Vj

(1, 1, 1) is a dual currency monetary equilibrium. Then there
=

v;

whenever currency risk is absent. If currency risk is

present, then there can be at most two distinct and mutually exclusive cases:
(i) Vj >

v;,

(ii) Vj <

v; which may not exist and,

which always exists and, if p is sufficiently small, satisfies

V'

v[;

S i::~;

in particular, does not exist either if x is sufficiently large

or if p is sufficiently small.
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The lemma shows that if there is no fundamental difference between the two currencies ( T = 0)
and p' = (1, 1, 1) and d = 1 is individually optimal, then the only monetary equilibrium is such that
both currencies are identically valued. Hence, the fh buyer would be indifferent between spending
the home money relative to the dollar and could choose any Pi E [0, 1]. When

T

> 0, however, this

is never the case. This is a general result which holds for any set of concave preferences.
Note that Vh = 0 is also a solution to (15). Given Vh = 0, it is straightforward to show that
there is a unique value Vt

> 0 that solves (16). In this case, the home currency has no value and

would not circulate. This is the limiting case of currency competition - only the good currency
circulates. Consequently, it corresponds to the mono-currency equilibrium studied by Camera and
Corbae with N = 2.

Since we are interested in dual currency monetary equilibria, we do not

analyze it in detail. While this equilibrium is not the focus of our attention, it is important to
recognize that it is one solution under the conjectured transaction pattern.
One immediate implication of Lemma 1 is that, although currency exchange does not occur,
the model generates an equilibrium distribution of real exchange rates (or relative prices). There
is more than one relative price in the model since different sellers produce different quantities for
different currencies. Let Ri =

i E {0,

f,

q{ / q?

denote the relative price offered by a seller with portfolio

h}. This measure gives us the real value of the dollar to a unit of the home currency.

Using (11) we obtain

0 the distribution of real exchange rates is degenerate, Ri = 1 \fi, since Vt = Vh and

When

T =

~~

1. When there is some currency risk, however, then Ro

=

< Rh < Rt for ~ < i::~; but

Ro < Rt < Rh if ~ > i::~;. Thus, as the risk on the home currency increases from zero, the
observed spread of real exchange rates increases. Although this is a cross-section of real exchange
rates, it loosely corresponds to the idea that greater currency risk leads to an increase in the
volatility of observed real exchange rates between the home currency and the dollar.
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5.1

Existence of the p'

=

(1, 1, 1) equilibrium

We study existence of the currency competition equilibrium by considering specific preferences.

Suppose u(q)

=

qa +q. We are able to obtain a closed-form equilibrium solution for Vh but not Vt:

(17)

(18)

The conditions in (8)-(9) reduce to:

.'...(1_+ A~J'-'-):-a
[- 7 A
1-

f

1

_-_1]1-a <Vt< (

[_,_(1_+-,;1-~-"h"-;~-h_-_1

r-a

Aj ) 1~a
1- At

(19)

1

< vh <

(20)

(21)

(22)

(23)
The two inequalities (19)-(20) are essentially the same as in Camera and Corbae (1999). In short,
the value of holding a unit of currency must be high enough to prevent 2-unit buyers from spending
all of their cash but not high enough to prevent expenditures by poor buyers on rich sellers. The
new restrictions arising from multiple currencies are (21), (22) and (23). Inequality (21) is the
condition for a buyer with a mixed portfolio to spend the dollar rather than the home currency on
a poor seller while (22) is the condition that he spends the dollar on a rich seller holding a unit of
the home currency. Inequality (23) ensures that a buyer

fh

only spends the dollar and not both.

Equation (21) shows that in equilibrium a necessary condition is that the dollar is more valued than
the home currency, Vt > Vh. This is a consequence of the net gain being monotonically increasing

in V.
15

With these preferences we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique currency
competition equilibrium.

Proposition 1. Consider u (q) = q + qa and a stationary distribution supporting the transaction

pattern d
and p

E

=

1 and p'

=

(1, 1, 1). There exist positive values

!JH

and

PH

such that if

!J

E (0, !JH)

(0, PH) then the currency competition equilibrium exists and is unique.

The intuition for these parameter values is as follows.

For sufficiently low trading frictions

(small p), price dispersion is low, and so agents are always willing to buy now rather than wait
for a better deal. 11 Low values of

!J

imply that the marginal utility of consumption is very high

but diminishes rapidly. This ensures that agents spend at least one unit of currency but not two.

If trading frictions are low, the buyer holding one unit of each currency is willing to spend the
safe foreign currency in all matches and hold onto the risky home currency. This is so because the
surplus in trade is increasing in the value of the currency and agents discount future consumption
less thereby increasing the value of the dollar relative to the home currency.

If preferences are CRRA, u(q) = qa, the equilibrium (VJ, V,;') must satisfy

It is straightforward to show that Vt and
sufficiently small, then VJ

vh

approach 1 as p,

T --+

0. By Lemma 1, when p

IS

> V,;', in which case the conditions in (8)-(9) reduce to:
1

--"--

[(1 +At)a -1]1-a < Vt <At"
1

[(1 + Ah)a- 1]1-a < Vh <

--"--

A~-a

v; - vt > v; - vh
(AhVh

11

(24)

+ Vt- Vh)a- Vt > A~V/:- Vh
Vh + VJ > (Vf + Ah Vh)a

This is because the amount of goods produced by a rich seller converges to the quantity produced by a poor seller

as A 1 and Ah approach 1. So there is nothing to gain by waiting to meet a poor seller.
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a set of constraints that m1rrors (19)-(23).

Given these expressiOns we can state the following

proposition:

Proposition 2.

Consider u (q)

qa. If p is sufficiently small then the currency competition

equilibrium does not exist.

The proof is immediate: the third inequality in (24) is violated when VJ is close to 1. Comparing
Propositions 1 and 2 we find that depending on the functional form of preferences, the currency
competition equilibrium may or may not exist for the same parameter values. This seems surprising
but is the result of the properties of the net gain from spending a dollar relative to the home currency
under these two utility specifications. The key element is whether or not S(V) is monotonically
increasing or not. To see this consider S(V) for the two utility specifications. For u(q) = qa, S(V)
is decreasing for values of V close to 1. In this case, for p small, VJ
Thus, it must be the case that S(VJ)

< S(V,;'), so po

equilibrium cannot exist. However, when
for any VJ

u(q)

=

qa

=

> V,;' and VJ is close to 1.

0 is optimal and the currency competition

+ q,

S(V) is monotonically increasing, hence

> V,;', it must be the case that S(VJ) > S(V,;') so po

= 1

is always optimal, which is

needed for the currency competition equilibrium to exist.

6

The Gresham's Law Equilibrium: p'

=

(0, 0, 0)

We now want to consider a world in which p' = (0, 0, 0). In this equilibrium, fh buyers tend to
'hoard' the good (safe) currency and spend the bad (risky) currency12 This equilibrium transaction
pattern has the flavor of Gresham's Law - the circulation of good money is reduced while the
circulation of bad money increases - and so we refer to it as such.
The solution procedure in the case where d = 1 and p' = (0, 0, 0) follows directly from that
12

This is a common occurrence in many developing and transitional economies - agents use dollars for some

transactions but carry out a majority of purchases using the risky home currency. Several papers have tried to model
this phenomenon [see Chang (1994), Uribe (1997), Engineer (2000), Sibert and Liu (1998)]. The main drawback of
these models is that they all rely on an ad- hoc assumption that the foreign currency has a relatively higher 'transaction
cost' (or trading friction) associated with its use as a medium of exchange. We want to consider a world in which
the fundamental trading environment and all trading frictions are the same for each currency.
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above. The value function expressions in (4) are unchanged, (5) becomes

while the quantities in ( 6) still hold with the only changes being

Substituting the equilibrium quantities into Vt and Vh yields

At [mou(Vt)

+ mtu(Ath Vt) + mhu(At Vt )]

(25)

1-1'

(26)
where (26) is defined only for Vh > (1- Ath)Vt. Once again, in a monetary equilibrium (VJ, V,;')
must be a positive fixed point of the map defined by (25)-(26).

Lemma 2. Suppose d = 1 and p' = (0, 0, 0) is a dual currency monetary equilibrium. Then there

always exists a unique positive V,;', and VJ

=

V,;' whenever currency risk is absent. If currency

risk is present, a fixed point VJ > V,;' > 0 exists whenever trading frictions are sufficiently limited.
This requirement is also sufficient to guarantee that (VJ, V,;') is unique and that

V'

v[;

<

t:t;h.

Determining the conditions under which the conjectured buying strategies are individually optimal follows from (7)-(9). With regards to the equilibrium distribution of money holdings, the
constraints (1) and (2) still hold but the steady-state flow conditions change and are listed in the
appendix. As before, we can generate sufficient conditions for an equilibrium distribution to exist

and can show that it is unique.
Note again that under the conjectured trading strategy Vt

=

0 solves (25). Given Vt

=

0, there

is a unique value of Vh > 0 that solves (26). This corresponds to a situation in which dollars do not
circulate at all despite being a less risky currency. In this case, only the bad currency circulates.
This is the extreme version of Gresham's Law. Again, this type of monetary equilibrium is a simple
variation of the mono-currency equilibrium studied by Camera-Corbae with the only difference
being that there is a 'tax' on the circulating currency. Again, we ignore this equilibrium and focus
our attention on the dual-currency equilibrium.
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By setting u(q)

=

qa

+ q we can

derive a set of conditions comparable to (17)-(23), which are

contained in the appendix. As noted earlier a critical requirement now is that Vt < Vh for po

=

0

to be optimal. This inequality is at the core of the following proposition:

Proposition 3.

q

Consider u (q)

+ qa.

If p is sufficiently small then the Gresham's Law

equilibrium does not exist.

This follows from the fact that limited trading frictions only support
This, combined with the monotonicity of S(V), makes po

= 1

Vj >

v;

(by Lemma 2).

optimal. Hence, the Gresham's Law

equilibrium cannot exist for p small. In order for it to exist, either the parameters yield

Vj < v;,

which seems unlikely when the home currency is risky, or S(V) cannot be monotonically increasing

in V.
For the utility function u(q)

Proposition 4.

pattern d
and p

E

=

=

Consider u (q)

1 and p'

=

qa, the following is proved:

=

qa and a stationary distribution supporting the transaction

(0,0,0). There exist positive values &Hand PH such that if

!J

E (O,&H)

(0, PH) then the Gresham's Law equilibrium exists and is unique.

The reason this equilibrium exists is because the parameter restrictions on p and

the solutions for Vj and

O"

ensure that

v; lie on the decreasing portion of S(V). In this case, even though the

dollar is more valuable and buys more goods, it is also a very valuable asset to give up. Hence, the
net gain from spending a dollar is very low while the net gain from spending the home currency is
higher despite its riskiness.
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7

Transaction Patterns and Relative Circulation

Here we address two issues by means of numerical analysis. 13 First, we discuss the existence of

equilibria when

d=

1 for all eight possible pure strategy vectors

p'

=

(p 0,pj,P/J Second, we

demonstrate how the currencies' transactions velocity responds to changes in the home currency

risk.
To illustrate the importance of trading frictions and home currency risk, for existence of equi-

libria, we let p and

T

be free to vary, for the baseline parameterization. When u(q) = qa

+ q,

only p' = (1, 1, 1) is an equilibrium, while Figure 1 displays the different equilibria existing when

u(q)

=

qa. The figure confirms the intuition developed via the propositions: if the home currency

risk is low and the economy is functioning well (trading is relatively easy to accomplish), then
home agents will spend the home currency first when conducting internal trades. However, if home
currency risk is high and the economy is not functioning well, then currency substitution occurs

and agents prefer to spend the foreign currency. In Figure 1, the currency competition equilibrium,
p* = (1, 1, 1), occurs when

i) the home currency risk is high and trading frictions are reasonably

low, ii) trading frictions are high butT is low or iii) both are high. The Gresham's Law equilibrium,
p* = (0, 0, 0), occurs when

i) trading frictions are high and the home currency risk is very low, ii)

trading frictions are very low and the currency risk is sufficiently high, or iii) both are low.
The intuition for this is as follows. When trading frictions are very low, buyers know that they
will meet another seller very quickly. If the home currency risk is also relatively low, then prices
in terms of the home currency are not much higher than dollar prices. However, by spending the
home currency, the

fh

buyer gets rid of the risky currency. In addition, because trading frictions

are low, he does not have to wait too long to spend the dollar because another trading opportunity
will arise quickly. Hence, he prefers to dump the risky currency even if he consumes a little less
today. When trading frictions are high, the

fh

buyer knows that he will not consume again for

awhile, hence he desires a sufficient amount of consumption today if a trading opportunity arises.
13

The results are presented via illustrations that were generated in the following way: 1) conjecture an equilibrium

vector p*, 2) pick a pair of values for the variables defined on the axes of each figure, 3) use this pair of values to
solve for the equilibrium distribution and value functions, 4) then check to see if the conjectured strategy vector p*
is individually optimal. If an equilibrium exists, then that parameter pair is shaded. This was done for 1 million
such pairs, for each of the 8 pure strategy candidate vectors p*. In all illustrations (unless otherwise noted) x
a=

0.5, p

= 0.08,

a=

5, M 1

= .75, and Mh = .25.
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= 0.4,

This leads him to spend the dollar and hold onto the home currency despite the risk of losing it in
the future.
What we would like to know, is how the relative circulation of the two currencies changes in
response to changes in home currency risk,

T.

In general, circulation is affected by two elements: the

sellers' willingness to accept the currency, and the buyers' willingness to spend it. By construction,
however, sellers always accept both currencies in our equilibria. Hence, for given supplies of the
two currencies, changes in their equilibrium circulation are driven by changes in their distribution
and the spending pattern. In order to measure the degree of circulation of each currency, we use
the transactions velocity that, we emphasize, is endogenous in our model.
Under the conjecture that d = 1,we can define the transaction velocity for each currency as
Vf =
Vh =

+ m2f) + (pomo + Ptmf + Phmh)mth}
ax{(1 -!")(mh + m2h) + [(1- po)mo + (1- Pt)mt + (1- Ph)mh]mth}·
ax{(1 -I" )(mt

The first term is the fraction of each currency that changes hands when buyers holding only that
currency meet sellers and spend one unit of their holdings. The second term captures how the
spending behavior of the buyer with a mixed portfolio affects the relative velocities of each currency.
Velocities are affected by the steady-state distribution of money holdings and by the equilibrium
strategy vector p*. In particular, a change in p* moves

Vf

and

vh

in opposite directions, ceteris

paribus.l 4 Thus, the government's confiscation/injection policy affects the velocity of each currency
via changes in the distribution of money holdings and the buyers' trading strategies.
Figure 2 illustrates the transaction velocities corresponding to the equilibria depicted in Figure
1 when p is fixed at its baseline value, and

T

is free to vary. Given that there is more home than

foreign currency (Mt = .75, Mh = .25), the transaction velocity for the home currency is always
the highest since more trades are being conducted with it, than the foreign currency. When

T =

0,

Vf = .74, and vh = .15; as the risk on the home currency increases, however, the velocities change

as the distribution of money holdings and the transaction pattern change. We can see that, for an
equilibrium associated with a given p*, increases in currency risk lead to small declines in vh and
small increases in Vf. Once the risk gets high enough, buyers with mixed portfolios begin spending
the foreign currency, rather than the home. Thus more transactions involve dollars, so that

vh

falls and v f increases. As the spending pattern changes, there are dramatic decreases in vh and
14

Note that if p*

= (1, 1, 1) and (m 1 + m 21 )

:=::::

(mh

+ m 2h),
21

then v 1

> vhand vice

versa if p*

= (0, 0, 0).

large increases in
.20 at

T =

Vf.

When

T =

1, then

Vf =

.55,

vh =

.28 and the ratio

vtfvh

rises to .51 (from

0). These results seem very intuitive and suggest that as the home currency becomes

increasingly risky, people 'substitute' out of the bad currency into the good currency causing the
circulation of the bad currency to fall and the circulation of the good currency to increase.
We next analyze how varying the degree of home currency risk,

T,

and the ratio of the home to

the foreign money stock affects the equilibrium transaction pattern by varying the relative supplies
of currencies when Mt

+ Mh

=

M

=

1. Figure 3 illustrates the equilibria when u(q) = qa, for

the baseline parameterization. Its main feature is that the equilibrium transaction pattern is not
driven by the relative amount of home currency in the economy. Rather, home currency risk is the
critical parameter. We also observe an interesting spending pattern. Given a value Mh/M, the fh
buyer always spends the home currency for low levels of home currency risk. As the risk factor
rises, this buyer begins spending the dollar when buying from sellers who already hold a unit of
the home currency, i.e. p' = (0, 0, 1). This occurs because the h sellers charge a low dollar price in
order to acquire a unit of safe currency to diversify their portfolio. As home currency risk continues
to increase, the fh buyer also starts spending the dollar on f sellers, i.e. p' = (0, 1, 1). Finally,
when the home risk is high enough, all sellers charge high prices in terms of the home currency, i.e.

p'

=

(1, 1, 1). Hence, buyers with a mixed portfolio always prefer to make dollar purchases.

Executing a similar exercise for u (q) = q + qa generates only the only equili bri urn p' = ( 1, 1, 1).
We had to decrease

!J

to 0.15 and p to 0.02 in order to find other equilibria. The results appear

in Figure 4. 15 Still, despite the fact that there are eight possible vectors p, only two of them are
an equilibrium, and are unique: p' = (1, 1, 1) and p' = (0, 1, 1). In Figure 4, when the home
currency risk is very low, p' = (1, 1, 1) is an equilibrium even when dollars form less than half of
the available currency. However, as

T

rises, p* = (1, 1, 1) is an equilibrium only if there is a large

supply of dollars. This corresponds to the idea of the economy being 'highly dollarized' - dollars
are the dominant source of currency, and the preferred medium of exchange. On the other hand,
if only few dollars are present in the economy, then p' = (1, 0, 1) is the unique equilibrium. In this
situation, agents holding a mixed portfolio only spend the dollar on rich sellers who charge a much
higher price for home currency. Poor sellers offer better prices in terms of home currency, since
they need cash; thus the buyer can afford to spend the bad currency in those trades.
15

Interestingly, if u(q) = qa, a= 0.15, and p = 0.02 then only p* = (1, 1, 1) exists.
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8

Conclusion

We have constructed a dual currency search model to study Gresham's Law and currency competition from first principles. We have investigated how changing levels of risk on a home currency
affects agents' transaction patterns and thus their willingness to use a safer foreign currency as a
preferred medium of exchange. Our results demonstrate that small changes in the degree of home
currency risk can result in lower circulation of the risky currency and higher circulation of the safer
currency.
Our analysis also contributes to the understanding of some aspects of the phenomenon commonly known as "dollarization", a concept that has a wide variety of meanings and uses. One of
the most common and basic forms of dollarization is the simultaneous use of a foreign currency
alongside the home currency as a media of exchange. This phenomenon is commonly associated to
the concept of currency substitution (Calvo and Vegh, 1992).
Given that two currencies are accepted as media of exchange in an economy, it is the extent of
the currency substitution taking place that is the relevant issue for policymakers. That is, what
is the relative use of the foreign currency to the home?

Our theoretical analysis allows us to

consider this question by focusing on key determinants in the patterns of circulation of a medium
of exchange, namely trading frictions and currency risk.
We find that a poorly functioning economy with risky home currency, is prone to dollarization.
Thus our analysis is consistent with the view that home agents will continue using the home
currency in internal trade if the purchasing power risk is kept very low, but once that risk gets
too high substantial currency competition kicks in. The normative aspect of our results is that a
low dollarized economy can avoid becoming highly dollarized by implementing policies aimed at
reducing currency risk and improving the trading environment so that the economy functions well.
At the same time our results serve as a warning that dollarization will be unavoidable if currency
risk is not kept under control.
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Appendix
Existence and uniqueness of a stationary distribution of portfolios when p' = (1, 1, 1).

I. Sufficient conditions for existence. We use a procedure similar to that used by Zhou

(1997).

Specifically, consider the state space M and an equilibrium point m' E M. Define a

real-valued function L on M, that satisfy the following requirements: (i) L is continuous and has
continuous first-partial derivatives (ii) L(m) has a unique minimum at m* with respect to all other
points in M. (iii) The function L(m) satisfies L(m) S 0 for all mE M. This function Lis called a
Liapunov function. We then rely on the Liapunov theorem stating that if there exists a Liapunov
function the equilibrium point m' is stable and if the function L(m)

< 0 at all

m

fc

m' then the

stability is asymptotic.
Equations (1)-(2) imply that {mo,mf,mh,77} are single-valued functions of {m2f,m2h,mfh}:
mf = Mt - mfh- 2m2!

(27)

mh = Mh - mfh- 2m2h
mo = 1- Mt - Mh + m2f + m2h + mfh

and the government budget constraint

(28)
Using (27) in (12)-(14) we get:
m2f = (Mt- mfh- 2m2!) (Mt- 2m2!)- m2f (1- Mt + m2f- m2h)

2

m 2h = x [ (Mh- mfh - 2m2h) - m2h (1 - Mh - m2f + m2h)]

+77 (Mh- mfh- 2m2h)- Tm2h

(29)

mfh = x[(Mt- mfh- 2m2!) m2h + (Mh- mfh- 2m2h) m2f

+2 (Mh- mfh- 2m2h) (Mt- mfh- 2m2!)- mfh (1- Mh- m2f + m2h)]
+77 (Mt- mfh- 2m2!)- Tmfh

with m1 +m2 +m3 S 1. Then define the system in (29) as

m=

F (m) where F(m) is a 3 x 1 vector.

Denote by F(m) [i] the ith row of F(m). Then, letting d~C:::)[i[ =a ( i, j), j, i = 1, 2, 3, the Jacobian

'
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of F( m) is a 3x3 matrix
a(1, 3)

a(1, 1)
dF(m)
dm

a(2, 2)
a(3, 1)

where, recalling that

T

is a constant,

a(1, 1)

= m2h

+ 2mfh +6m2!- 3Mt- 1 < 0
a(1, 2)

a(1, 3)

=

= x

2m2!- Mt < 0 (since Mt > 2m2!)

= xm2h

+

-2x [Mh- mfh- 2m2h] + d!~h (Mh- mfh- 2m2h)-

a(2, 3)

=

a(3, 1)

= x

a(3, 2)
a(3, 3)

=

= m2f

d'/:?;f (Mh- mfh- 2m2h) > 0
x [4mfh + m2f + 6m2h- 3Mh- 1] + d!';h (Mh- mfh- 2m2h)- 2ry- T
a(2, 1)

a(2, 2)

a(3, 3)

=

T)

d'/:?;J (Mh- mfh- 2m2!)- 2ry
x [2mfh +4m2!- 3Mtl + d!';h (Mt- mfh- 2m2!)

[4mfh + 4m2h- 3Mh] +

[4mfh +4m2!+ 2m2h- Mh- 2Mt- 1] + d!~h (Mt- mfh- 2m2!)-

where we note that

1ft;

T)-

T

> 0 for all mi. We note that Mt > mfh +2m2! and Mh > mfh + 2m2h if

mf, mh > 0, using (27)-(??). Substituting the infimum Mt = mfh +2m2! and Mh = mfh + 2m2h

in a(2, 2), a(3, 2) and a(3, 3), it is easy to show that all of these terms are strictly negative as

T) --+

0

o-. Thus there are small values ofT)> 0 such that a(2, 2), a(2, 3), a(3, 2) and a(3, 3)
are all negative. Note that T)--+ 0 when either T--+ 0 or Mh --+ 0, and so does 1ft; > 0 for all mi.

while a(2, 3)

--+

We want to show that d~(;;'l is negative definite. To do so we can consider the sign of its three
principal minors:

a(1, 1) a(1, 2) a(1, 3)
D1

a(1, 1), D2

=

a(1, 1) a(1, 2)
=

,

and D3

=

a(2, 1) a(2, 2) a(2, 3)

a(2, 1) a(2, 2)
a(3, 1) a(3, 2) a(3, 3)
We note that D1
mf >

=

a(1, 1) < 0. This is so because Mt 2 mfh +2m2! (with strict inequality if

0) using (27). Substituting

Mt = mfh +2m2! in a(1, 1) provides a maximum for a(1, 1).

This maximum is seen to be negative since

The minor D2

=

-mfh

+ m2h- 1 <

0.

a(1, 1)a(2, 2)- a(1, 2)a(2, 1). Note that a(1, 2) and a(2, 1) are both positive,

and that their product tends to zero as x and T) shrink to 0. Furthermore, a(2, 2) < 0 as T) tends
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to zero because -3Mh - 1 + 4mfh + m2f + 6m2h < 0 (since Mh 2 mfh + 2m2h)· Thus D2 > 0 for
x and 17 small (i.e. either Tor Mh small).

The third minor is
D3

=

a(1, 1) [a(2, 2)a(3, 3)- a(2, 3)a(3, 2)]

-a(1, 2) [a(2, 1)a(3, 3)- a(2, 3)a(3, 1)]
+a(1, 3) [a(2, 1)a(3, 2)- a(2, 2)a (3, 1)]
Note that as ry, x-+ 0 then the second and third line in D3 vanish, and that the first line, is strictly
negative and given by

We conclude that there exist an Mh and x positive but sufficiently small such that D1 < 0, D2 > 0
and D3 < 0. Thus, for Mh and x small the matrix d~(;;'l is negative definite (see Chiang).
Since F(m) is a 3xl vector ('''transposes it), define the function

We show it is a Liapunov function. It is continuous (by construction) and it has continuous first

partial derivatives.

Recalling that the vector F(m)

vector) and that dF(m)/dt

=

[

d~f:l]' m (a

=

m,

that d[F(m)]'/dt

=

m'd~t;:) (a 1x3

3x1 vector) then the time derivative of L(m) is the

quadratic form (a scalar)
. , [dF(m)]' .
)
. ,dF(m).
L. (m=m
m+m
m
dm
dm

so that L(m)

0 if

=

m=

0, and < 0 if m fc 0 for

X

and Mh small, since d~f:l is negative definite.

To show that there exists an m' such that L(m')
L(m)

=

m fc

0 for all m defined above then L(m)

fc

=

0 we use a proof by contradiction. If

0. Since m is defined on a compact set it

follows that L(m) has a maximum, say l < 0 (because of negative definiteness). But this cannot
be since, defining m(t) to be the state of the system at date t,
[

L(m(s))ds

which in turn implies L(m(t))

=

L(m(t))- L(m(O)) S lt

-----+

=?

L(m(t)) S lt + L(m(O))

-oo as t-----+ oo. This can't be since at every date, by construction,

L(m) ~ 0. Thus L(m) must be reaching a minimum 0 at some m*. To show that m* is unique, see
below.
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Thus L(m) is a Liapunov function, and applying the Liapunov Theorem (see Azariadis, 1993,
for a discrete time version) the unique equilibrium m' is asymptotically stable if x and Mh are
positive but sufficiently small. The money distribution m' is unique and stationary.
II. Uniqueness. Using (27)-(28) and Mt + Mh < 2, then mi > 0 and 17 < 1 require

We now show that for a feasible pair { m2h, m2f}, if mjh solves (14), then it must be unique. Using
(14) and (a1)-(a4) we obtain
( Mt - mfh -2m2!) (

1 nn2f

TMh

nn2h nnfh

+ xm 2h)

mth=--------~-,~-7~~~-=--~------L

T

+x(1- Mh+m2h- m2f)

x (Mh- mfh- 2m2h) [m2f + 2 (Mt- mfh- 2m2!)]

+

T

+ x (1- Mh + m2h- m2f)

·

The right hand side can be shown to be strictly decreasing in mfh for all feasible values of mfh, m2h,
and m2f. It then follows that ifthere is a feasible mjh that solves this expression, then it is unique.
We now show that for a feasible value of mfh, a unique pair { m2h, m2t} solves (12) and (13).
Using (12) and (a1)-(a4) we obtain m2h
f ( mfh, m2f ) = 1 - Mt

m2f) where

= f(mfh,

+ m2f -

(, M-"-t_-_m~fc::h_-_2_m_2:ocf.!....)-'-(M~t'----2_m-=.2f'-'-)
m2f

which is easily seen to be increasing in m2f for feasible values m2f S (Mt- mfh)/2. Furthermore

it is concave in m2f.
Using (13) and (a1)-(a4) we obtain m2f
T
h ( m f h, m2h ) = x

+1-

= h(mfh,

m2h) where

[17 +X (Mh- mfh- 2m2h)] (Mh- mfh- 2m2h)
M h + m2h - '-'-------'---'-'------"-''-------"='-'----'----=------=..'"xm~

which is easily seen to be increasing and concave in

m2h

'7 is increasing in m2h· Note also that f(mfh, m2f)
m2h -+ 0. Note that m2h S (Mh- mfh)/2

<

-+

for feasible values m2h::; (Mh-mfh)/2,since

-oo as m2f

-+

0 and h(mfh, m2h) -+ -oo as

f(mfh, (Mt- mfh)/2) and m2f S (Mt- mfh)/2

<

h(mfh, (Mh- mfh)/2). The properties of the two functions imply there is a single crossing point
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for the two functions in the feasible part of the (m2h, m2f) plane. Thus, for any feasible value of
mfh and 7], there is a unique pair { m2h,

m21 }

that solves the system

Given the uniqueness of the values in (27)-(28) and ffiJh,then if a feasible distribution exists, it is
unique.

Proof of Lemma 1.

Conjectured= 1 and p' = (1, 1, 1) and consider

T

> 0. Using (10) it follows that

H(Vh) is a monotonically increasing and strictly concave function of Vh, which starts at 0 and has
a decreasing first derivative that vanishes as Vh -+ oo. Thus, it has two fixed points, one is Vh = 0
(the mono-currency equilibrium, which we ignore), and the other is

Given

v;

> 0.

V,;' use once again (3) and (11) so that in equilibrium

defined only for Vt 2 (1- Ah) V,;'. F (Vf, V,;') is strictly concave and monotonically increasing in

Vt. As Vt

-++

(1- Ah)V,;' then F (Vf, V,;') converges to a positive value, and its slope becomes

unbounded. Thus, the intermediate value theorem suggest there can be at most two positive fixed
points to the map pVf = F (Vf, V,;').

> V,;' exists if

1. A fixed point VJ

pVf- F(Vf, V,;')lvJ-v'h < 0

{c}

H(V,;') < F(V,;')

(30)

since F(Vf, V,;') is strictly concave and V,;' satisfies pV,;' = H (V,;'). Using the definition of

H (V,;'), rearrange (30) as

(31)
always satisfied since Ah
equilibrium and

T

< At. Hence

v;

> 0.
30

>

v;

always exists when p' = (1, 1, 1)

IS

an

2. Notice that (31) holds as an equality iff

T =

0, so that

v; = v; is the unique positive fixed

point.
3. If

v; > v;' then ~ s

i::~;

for all

T

2 0 if p is small This is so whenever

1- Ah
- 1 - At

< -----,:..:.

satisfied with equality as

T --+

0 since F

(Vt, V,;')

--+ +

H (V,;'); ifT

> 0 then limp~o i::~;

--+

oo

but F (V,;') / H (V,;') is bounded. Concavity ofF (Vt, V,;') completes the argument.
4. We now show that if another fixed point Vj' of the map pVt = F (Vt, V,;')exists when

it must be such that Vj' < V,;'. To show it note that F (V, V,;')
V = VL

=

0

=

> 0,

0 for some positive

< (1- Ah) V,;'. However, H (VL) > 0 since it is increasing, and H(O)

is Cl 0 < vL < (1- Ah) v; such that F (vL, v;)

T

=

0. That

< H (vL). Since v; > v; always

exists, then it must be that F(V, V,;') intersects H(V) at some point VH 2 (1- Ah) V,;', i.e.
F (VH, V,;') = H (VH), satisfied iff

Since At > Ah then this last equality can be satisfied only if u(VH - (1 - Ah) V,;')
u(AhVH)

< 0, i.e. if VH < V,;'. Since F (VH, V,;')

=

H (VH) 2 pVH (i.e. the functions

intersect above the line traced by pV) it must be that Vj' < VH < V,;'.
5.

Vj* <

v; cannot exist if

which we can rewrite as

mou((1- Ah) V,;')

+ mtu(At (1- Ah) V,;')-

(1- Ah) [mou(V,;')

> (1- Ah) [mhu(AhV,;')-

~v;]

+ mtu(Ah V,;')]

(33)

The LHS of the inequality is always positive 1h > 0 since At > Ah and u ((1- Ah) k) >
(1 - Ah) u( k) for any k > 0, due to Jensen's inequality. The RH Soft he inequality is negative
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if Tis close to one since

as

T

v; > xmhu(Ah v;); it is also decreasing in T since Ah and v;

shrinks. Hence by the intermediate value theorem (33) holds for any p if

large. However, it can be shown that (33) holds for
that as p

--+

0 then LH S, RH S

--+

T

T

increase

sufficiently

if pis sufficiently small. To do so note

0, but LH S > RH S in the limit since the LH S has a

partial relative to p, compared to RH S, when p is around 0.
6. If d

=

1 and p'

=

(1, 1, 1) is an equilibrium, then equilibria with Vj' <

v;

and Vj >

v;

cannot coexist, i.e. they are mutually exclusive. To prove it consider the first constraint in

(9), S(Vt) > S (Vh)· If S(V) is monotonically increasing then S(Vt) > S (Vh) only if Vt > Vh
(never if Vt < Vh)· If S(V) is hump-shaped then (i) if Vh is on the decreasing segment of

S(Vh) then S(Vt) > S (Vh) only if Vt < Vh (never if Vt > Vh) and (ii) if Vh is on the increasing
segment of S(Vh) then S(Vt) > S (Vh) only if Vt > Vh (never if Vt < Vh)· •

Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider an equilibrium distribution that satisfies (1)-(2) and (12)-(14). From a prior discussion
we know that it exists, under certain conditions.

It is straightforward to show that (22) and (23) are satisfied as strict inequalities, whenever

1<

VI
1-Ah
vh ::;
1 _A 1 .

B y continuity
· · 1-Ah
1 _A 1 <

VI
vh

· fi es t h ese two Inequa
·
]"Ities
· I·f
a Iso satis

VI
·
vh IS

a b ove-b ut

close to-i::~;. From Lemma 1 we know that there always exists a unique fixed point of (15)-(16)

Vj >

v; when T

> 0, such that Vj ;v; S i::~; for p > 0 small. As a result, we know that there

exists a PHl > 0 such that (22) and (23) and Lemma 1 are satisfied for some p E (0, PHI).
What remains to be shown is that when Vj >

v; satisfies (17) and (18), then it also satisfies

(19) and (20). The intervals defined by the bounds in (19) and (20) are non-empty for all values
of At, Ah and !J. Furthermore, At and Ah converge to 1 as p approaches zero. Comparing the
expressions in (17) and (18) to the respective upper bounds in (19) and (20) it is easy to verify
the existence of a value of positive PH < PHl such that for p E (0, PH), (17) is below the upper
bound in (20) and (18) is below the upper bound in (19) for all Vj >

v;.

Furthermore, as !7

approaches zero, the lower bounds of (19) and (20) approach zero, while (17) and (18) converge to
positive values. Consequently, there exists a !JH E (0, 1) such that if !J E (0,!7H), and p E (O,pH),
then there is always a unique positive fixed point Vj >
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v; that satisfies (17) and (18), and it also

satisfies (19)-(23), i.e. an equilibrium exists such that the conjectured transaction pattern d
and p'

=

=

1

(1, 1, 1) is individually optimal.•

Proof of Lemma 2.

Conjecture d

=

1 and p'

=

(0, 0, 0) and consider

T

> 0. Inspection of (25) shows that its

RH S is a monotonically increasing strictly concave function of Vt, which starts at 0 and has a
decreasing first derivative that vanishes as Vt

-+

oo. Thus, it has two fixed points, one is Vt

=

0

(the mono-currency equilibrium, which we ignore), and the other is Vj > 0 which satisfies
(34)
Given

V,;', Consider the map defined by (26) i.e.

defined only for Vt > (1- Ath)Vj. The function H ( Vh, Vj) is strictly concave for Vh 2 (1 -At h) Vj,
and monotonically increasing in Vh. As Vh

-++

(1- Ath)Vj then H ( Vh, Vj) converges to a positive

quantity, and its slope becomes unbounded. Thus, the intermediate value theorem suggest there
can be two positive fixed points to the map Vh

=

H ( Vh, Vj) . A fixed point such that Vj > V,;'

exists if

(35)
Furthermore, it will be unique if

Using (34) we can rewrite the inequality in (35) as

+ mtu(Ath Vj) + mhu(AtV;l]
[mou(Vj) + mtu(Ah Vj) + mhu(Ath Vj)]

At [mou(Vj)

> Ah

(37)

Let Vj be any positive constant. Recall that Ath > At > Ah. It follows that as p

Ath, Ah, Ah

-+

0, hence both sides of the inequality converge to zero. As p

-+

-+

oo then

0 then Ath, Ah

-+

1

but Ah < 1, and the RHS side of the inequality converges to a positive number smaller than the
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LHS. It is easy to show that both sides of the inequality are decreasing in p. Since (37) is satisfied
as p

--+

0 small, by continuity there is a pH 3

in which case VJ

> Vh when p'

=

> 0 such that the inequality above holds If p

(1, 1, 1), d

=

E

(0, pH 3 )

,

1 and T > 0.

It is a matter of algebra to show that (37) is likely to be violated if T

> 0 small, x "' 0, mf "' 0,

and p large. That is, when the trading frictions are large but the risk on the home currency is quite
limited. It is also obvious that if T = 0 then (35) holds as an equality hence VJ = Vh is the unique
positive fixed point (the other fixed point is Vt = Vh = 0).
To show that the positive fixed point ( VJ, V,;') is unique, rewrite inequality (36) as

+ mtu(Ath VJ) + mhu(AtVJ)]
[mou((1 -At h) VJ) + mtu(Ah (1 -At h) VJ)]

(1- At h) At [ mou(VJ)

< Ah
Note that as p

--+

0 then Ath

--+

1 hence both sides of the inequality converge to zero. Let VJ be

any positive constant. Take the partial of each side of the inequality with respect to p, and then
take the limit as p

--+

0. In this way, the partial of RH S of the inequality is seen to be positive

and unbounded since u'

((1- Ath) VJ)

--+

oo as Ath--+ 1. The partial of LHS of the inequality,

however, is bounded. By the intermediate value theorem it follows that there is a
that (32) holds If p E (0,

PH 4).

PH 4

> 0 such

Hence the equilibrium ( VJ, V,;') is unique and such that VJ

> V,;'

given d = 1 and p' = (0, 0, 0).
For p small and

T > 0, t:;{/h

> ~ always since the left-hand side converges to infinity while

the right-hand side converges to a finite number. •

Proof of Proposition 3.
If p' = (0, 0, 0) and d = 1 then the laws of motion must satisfy

+ mh)
in2h = x[m~ + mhmfh- m2h (mo + mf )] + rymh- Tm2h
x[mfm2h + mhm2f + 2mhmf- mfh (mo + mh)] + rymf- Tmfh
in2f

inth

=

=

mfmf- m2f (mo

and we can apply the same procedure as before to show that a unique stationary distribution exists.
When u(q) = qa

+ q,

we obtain the following expressions for the value functions and the

34

optimality constraints

1

[

Af )
1- At

(1 + At )a - 1]1-a < Vt < (
1- At
1

[

(1

+ Ah)a- 1]1-a < Vh < (
1- Ah

1
1-a

(38)

1

AJ; )
1- Ah

1-a

(39)
(40)

Vt <Vh
A!]V,;'

+ (1 -At h) Vt > (1- Ah) Vh + A3VJ

(1 -At h) Vt

(41)

+ V,;' > (Vh + Ath Vt )a

(42)

As before,inequalities (38) and (39) on the value functions are needed to ensure that 'rich' buyers
only spend one unit of currency and 'poor' buyers buy from 'rich' sellers. Inequalities (40) and (41)
are the conditions needed to ensure that the p'
(42) ensures the

fh

=

(0, 0, 0) strategy is optimal. The last inequality

buyer only spends the home currency and not both. The surprising feature of

these constraints is that despite its riskiness, the home currency must be more valuable than the
dollar for this equilibrium to exist. This sharp relationship regarding the magnitude of Vt relative
to

vh

is a result of the u (q)

=

q + qa preference specification.

Note, that (38) and (39) are identical to (17) and (18). As note in the proof of Proposition 1, it
follows that they can hold if p is sufficiently small. Contradicting this requirement, Lemma 2 has
shown that (40) is violated whenever p is sufficiently small. It follows that p'

=

cannot be an equilibrium if trading frictions are too low .•

Proof of Proposition 4.
The value functions must solve

Vh

=

{~[mo
+mtAJ; +mh(1- (1- Ath) (Vt/Vh))a]}
1-1'
35

1
1

-a

(0, 0, 0) and d

=

1

It is straightforward to show that

v;

and

v;

sufficiently small, it must be that case that

approach 1 as p,

T --+

0. By Lemma 2, when p is

Vj > V,;'. Consequently, the conditions in (8)-(9)

reduce to:

(ignore otherwise)

As before the first four conditions are satisfied when p and

!J

are sufficiently small since Ath and

Vt approach 1 while Ah and Vh converge to values less than one for

t:f/h

> ~ always (see Lemma 2). Finally, for

when Vt

!J

T

> 0. For p small and

T

> 0,

close to zero, the last inequality is always satisfied

> Vh. By the intermediate value theorem we conclude that there exist positive values (f H

and PH such that if

!J

E (0, (fH) and p E (0, PH) then a the Gresham's Law equilibrium exists and

is unique .•

36

T

10

0.0

p
10

00

Figure 1

'

01

.

;u.m I ,.I)

I
~K- Wfi'I'Ml

••

•119Cirt

J,
JtDl Of fof'dtn..,
6.Jil~

!

••

"'bn()l

-

t

f<tllip cat_, 'ilf(l(il)

•
Figure 2

37

1.0

7

IMh/M

00
0~

0 998

Figure 3

7

I0

I,0, I

1,1,1
00

\1--,"T"'"'T'...,....,--,-;:;:::~~~,.......,...."'T""T-,--,~ Mh/M
0~

0 ?98

Figure 4

38

